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Beyond Bad Beliefs 
Abstract​: Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad             
beliefs​, beliefs that are true and apparently well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable.           
Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these               
beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes            
engendered by bad beliefs makes them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an              
alternative account of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad beliefs’ badness             
originates not in a failure of sufficient evidence but in a failure to respond adequately to reasons.                 
I motivate this alternative account through an analogy to recent discussions of moral worth              
centered on the well-known grocer case from Kant’s ​Groundwork​, and by showing that this              
analogy permits the proposed account to generalize to bad attitudes beyond belief. The paper              
concludes by contrasting the implications of moral encroachment and of the proposed account             
for bad attitudes’ blameworthiness. 
 
Word count​: 8269, including notes and references 
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1. Introduction 
In his ​Mirror to America​, historian John Hope Franklin recounts a party at The Cosmos Club, a                 
Washington D.C. social club: “It was during our stroll through the club that a white woman                2
called me out, presented me with her coat check, and ordered me to bring her coat. I patiently                  
told her that if she would present her coat to a uniformed attendant, ‘and all of the club                  
attendants were in uniform,’ perhaps she could get her coat.” Nearly all Cosmos Club attendants               
were Black, while few members were, likely explaining the woman’s false belief. But there’s              
something amiss with that belief, beyond its falsity: were Franklin an attendant, the woman’s              
belief would still be, in some sense, morally bad. A puzzle emerges from these ​bad beliefs​, as                 3
I’ll call them. How can some beliefs be true, apparently well-evidenced, and bad, all at the same                 
time? 
 
Bad beliefs have only recently enjoyed sustained and widespread attention from analytic            
philosophers. However, an increasingly popular explanation of the beliefs’ badness, known as            
moral encroachment​, is already emerging. The approach holds that whether a claim is backed by               
sufficient evidence isn’t strictly a function of the evidence; it is also a function of the moral                 
stakes engendered by the belief. According to this approach, though the statistical correlation             
between being an attendant and being Black is strong, it is not strong enough to justify the                 
woman’s belief given the high moral stakes that beliefs with that content engender.  
 
1 I am grateful to Jessica Brown, Caleb Perl, Mark Schroeder, Matthew Scarfone, Nicholas Laskowski, Mark van Roojen,                                   
Keshav Singh, Alexandra Lloyd, Spencer Case, and the audience at RoME 2019 for feedback on earlier manuscripts. I am                                     
particularly grateful to Rima Basu, from whom I’ve learned much, for many valuable conversations over the years. 
2 Gendler (2011) also offers this case in her discussion of implicit bias. 
3 Philosophers disagree about whether true beliefs can be bad in the sense alluded to below, some maintaining that all bad                                         
beliefs are false. I will assume, perhaps controversially, that true beliefs can be bad. This assumption does not compromise                                     
the view defended below for its distinctive explanation of a belief’s badness is independent from claims about the belief’s                                     
truth-value for it applies to attitudes that are not truth evaluable. 
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However, as I will argue, the badness of bad beliefs is better explained by analogy with the                 
observation that morally vicious people can manifest a vice even when doing what’s right for the                
right reasons. Bad beliefs are a special case of this phenomenon: some true and well-evidenced               
beliefs can manifest vice even when true and well-evidenced. According to the view advanced              
here, attitudes like the Cosmos Club woman’s belief are bad when they are badly premised or                
‘based’ on good reasons. This account has three advantages over the explanation provided by              
moral encroachment: (i) explanations of this general type are already widely accepted; (ii) the              
explanation generalizes to attitudes that don’t clearly involve epistemic justification; and (iii) it             
accounts for the moral, not merely epistemic, badness of bad beliefs. 
 
I conclude by contrasting the differing implications of moral encroachment and the proposed             
account for practices of praise, blame, resentment, and punishment. According to moral            
encroachment, certain beliefs are, by their morally fraught nature, bad to have. As a result, bad                
beliefs’ badness explains why individuals are made worse by those beliefs, perhaps to the point               
where the individuals themselves deserve blame or sanction. In contrast, the account I propose              
reverses this relationship. According to it, the badness of ​people​, very roughly, explains why              
their beliefs are sometimes bad. This metaphysical difference between the two accounts implies a              
difference in what grounds blame for bad beliefs. According to advocates of moral             
encroachment, that a person has a bad belief is non-circular grounds for blaming them. In               
contrast, bad beliefs ​all by themselves do not license blame according to the account I propose.                
Rather, that license comes from cues about the blameworthy person’s bad character.  
2 Stage Setting: From Pragmatic Encroachment to Moral Encroachment 
 
Cases like the following drove important debates in the 90’s and 00’s about the semantics of                
knowledge attributions, whose influence still shapes epistemology:  
 
Bank Case 1​. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to                 
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past                 
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the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday                 
afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as            
possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right              
away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on              
Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots             
of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was just                 
there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.” 
 
Bank Case 2​. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case                  
1, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on               
Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only             
two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we                
have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not               
deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check           
we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank                
is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks                
do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?”             
Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I                
reply, “Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.” (DeRose (1992 : 913)) 
 
The agents plausibly satisfy ‘knows’ in Case 1 but not Case 2. But Case 1 and Case 2 differ only                    
in whether the agents have written a large check, not in their evidence. This difference between                
Case 1 and Case 2 has come to be called a difference in practical stakes. So it appears that                   
practical stakes affect whether one knows, or at least whether one satisfies ‘knows’.  
 
A prominent explanation of this phenomenon is ​pragmatic encroachment about propositional           
justification​, the kind of justification sensitive to the strength of my evidential reasons for a               
belief. For example, if I believe that Garfield is a cat, I’m ​propositionally justified, other things                
equal, in believing that he’s a mammal because my evidential reasons for believing that he’s a                
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mammal are very strong. Doxastic justification implies propositional justification and a further            
condition: that I’ve correctly based my belief on sufficient evidence. For example, if I’ve used a                
deviant inference rule in the formation of my belief that Garfield is a mammal -- such as the rule                   
that I should form the belief that Garfield is a mammal in response to any other belief                 
whatsoever -- then my belief, while ​propositionally​ justified, is not ​doxastically​ justified. 
 
Pragmatic encroachment appears well motivated. There is more at stake for some beliefs than              
others. For example, there is more at stake in my belief that my recent spider bite ​isn’t a black                   
widow bite than my belief that the Raptors won the NBA championship. Only one belief implies                
that I need immediate medical attention if false. According to advocates of pragmatic             
encroachment, since the practical stakes are higher for my black widow belief than for my               
Raptors belief, the former requires more evidence to be justified than the latter even when both                
beliefs are equally likely to be true, given my evidence. Likewise, though the protagonists’              
evidence is the same in Case 1 and Case 2, the practical stakes are higher in the second than in                    
the first. That’s why the two agents satisfy ‘knows’ only in the first case -- only in the first case                    
are the practical stakes for false belief low enough for the belief to be justified, given their                 
evidence. Pragmatic encroachment is thus the view that, the higher the practical stakes for a               
believer getting a belief wrong, the higher the threshold for that belief’s propositional             
justification, relative to that agent.  
 
Perhaps partly for path-dependent reasons, early discussion of cases like 1 and 2 focused on how                
certain beliefs, when false, endanger the believer’s interests. Recent scholarship questions this            
focus. If interests affect the threshold for a belief’s justification, why should only the believer’s               4
interests matter? According to ​moral encroachment​, harms to ​others​’ interests by a belief’s             
possible falsehood raise the threshold for justifying that belief. If pragmatic encroachment is             
plausible in some cases, then so too is moral encroachment: it doesn’t matter if you or I got bit                   
by the spider, my belief that it wasn’t a black widow bite appears harder to justify than my belief                   
that the Raptors won the championship, even if my evidence equally supports each belief. 




Philosophers like Basu, Bolinger, Moss, and Schroeder have appealed to moral encroachment, or             
to closely related phenomena, to explain the badness of bad beliefs. According to moral              
encroachment, the belief that Franklin is an attendant, when based on the fact that Franklin is                
Black, harms Franklin’s interests, broadly construed. There are competing theories about why            
such a belief might be harmful. Perhaps it so because it is an instance of what Basu and                  
Schroeder (2018) call ​doxastic wronging , the idea that believing certain fraught claims about an              5
individual can wrong them, or perhaps, as Bolinger (2018) suggests, it risks a more              
conventionally wrong action --- I’ll stay neutral on this question. Exponents of moral             
encroachment allege that because beliefs are morally fraught, the moral stakes in having them              
are higher than they would be otherwise. Because the moral stakes are high, the threshold for                
their justification is correspondingly high. So the bad beliefs are bad because they are not               
propositionally justified. 
 
The moral encroachment explanation of bad beliefs is the conjunction of two claims: moral              
encroachment about propositional justification and that bad beliefs enjoin high moral stakes. As             
such, we can resist the explanation by resisting either conjunct. For example, some resist the very                
idea that stakes, whether prudential or moral, can affect justification on the grounds that stakes               
do not bear on truth and that only considerations bearing on truth can affect justification. Others                6
do so, for encroachment violates certain plausible epistemic principles like closure. Or we can              7
resist the claim that bad beliefs enjoin high moral stakes by harming certain interests, broadly               
construed.  8
 
My line of argument against moral encroachment differs from these potent objections. I will not               
argue against moral encroachment directly. Rather, I will advance an independently motivated            
5 See also Marusic (2018). 
6 For defenses of the view that only truth-related considerations affect justification see, ​inter alia​, Conee and                 
Feldman (1985), Shah (2006); Shah and Velleman (2005) and Worsnip (2015). It is largely taken for granted that                  
stakes are not truth-related considerations.  
7 See Anderson and Harthorne (forthcoming). 
8 See Begby (forthcoming) and Baumann (2018). 
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alternative explanation of bad beliefs’ badness that enjoys several advantages over the moral             
encroachment explanation. In addition to being independently motivated, this account extends to            
non-doxastic attitudes. Views like moral encroachment ​cannot extend to non-doxastic attitudes           
since they concern the relationship between moral stakes and evidence. The proposed            9
explanation therefore generalizes in a way that moral encroachment, by its very nature, cannot.              
Second, the proposed explanation enables a relatively straightforward account of why bad beliefs             
are both ​morally and ​epistemically bad, not merely the latter, by tying bad beliefs to bad                
character. Bad beliefs, on the view proposed, are derivatively bad because they derive from the               
believer’s bad character. That’s why they license blame in a way that other under-evidenced              
beliefs do not. 
3 Bad Hopes and Dreams 
Belief is plainly not the only propositional attitude that can be bad or objectionable in some                
sense, but we must be careful to distinguish objectionable attitudes in general from those that are                
bad in the manner of bad beliefs. For example, the hope that Franklin is an attendant is also bad                   
--- very bad indeed --- when one’s reason for hoping that Franklin is an attendant is, for example,                  
the deeply racist belief that it is fitting or good for African-Americans to be attendants. However,                
this hope’s badness is not puzzling: it is based on the deeply racist, unevidenced belief that it is                  
fitting or good for African-Americans to be attendants. The normative reasons for the hope,              
insofar as there are any, are clearly not strong enough to license the hope. It’s not puzzling why                  
the hope is bad. In contrast, what makes bad beliefs puzzling is that the reasons on which they’re                  
based, their ‘motivating’ or ‘optative’ reasons, provide them apparently adequate evidential           
support. So this bad hope is structurally disanalogous to the bad beliefs with which we’re               
concerned.  
 
9 Indeed, on this point, Basu (forthcoming) clarifies, “​Moral encroachment wouldn't be relevant in these further                
cases of doxastic wronging because other mental states like perceptions and desires don't function to be justified by                  
the evidence at all. That is, morality can't bear on the justification of these states because justification itself arguably                   
doesn't apply to these states. In summary, moral encroachment and doxastic wronging are not only conceptually                
distinct views, but views that plausibly apply independently to token psychological state formation” (14-15).  
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However, as I’ll now show, we can construct analogous cases using non-doxastic attitudes like              
disappointment and excitement. They are structurally analogous, unlike the case of hope above,             
in the sense that their motivating reasons apparently provide adequate normative support, just as              
bad beliefs’ supporting evidence is apparently adequate. Disappointment and excitement are not            
doxastic attitudes, so moral encroachment’s evidence-based explanation of bad beliefs does not            
clearly extend to these attitudes. Nevertheless, the sense in which they’re bad --- ​i.e.​, by tokening                
a bad attitude, the tokener is liable to moralized blame --- closely resembles bad beliefs’ badness,                
crying out for a more general explanation than moral encroachment, as a view about evidence,               
can provide. 
 
Here is, in a nutshell, the account that I develop over the next few pages. Earlier I distinguished                  
between propositional and doxastic justification. A belief is propositionally justified when there            
is sufficient evidential reason for it and doxastically justified when it is properly based on those                
reasons. This distinction is a species of a broader genus. The broader distinction --- between ​ex                
ante and ​ex post justification --- applies to all reasons-responsive attitudes: an attitude ​A              10
(perhaps relative to an individual ​X​) is ​ex ante justified just in case there is sufficient reason (for                  
X​, perhaps) to have ​A and ​X​’s attitude ​A is ​ex post justified just in case it is ​ex ante justified and                      
properly based. For example, we might hold that desiring an ice cream cone is ​ex ante justified                 11
just when there is sufficient reason to desire the ice cream cone and someone’s desire for that ice                  
cream cone is ​ex post​ justified when it is ​properly  based​ on those reasons.   12
 
Generalizing the propositional/doxastic distinction to the ​ex ante/ ex post distinction illuminates            
two strategies for offering a fully general account of bad attitudes. ​It may be that bad attitudes                 
10 I’m following Goldman (1979)’s distinction between ​ex ante and ​ex post justification, but like recent authors such                  
as, Lord (2018) and Neta (2019), I apply the distinction as I do, to the rationality of reasons-responsive attitudes                   
more generally. 
11 I am using ‘​ex post​ justified’ in the way that others use ‘fitting’ --- see, for example, McHugh and Way (2016) and 
Howard (forthcoming). 
12 I am assuming that non-cognitive attitudes like desires can be justified in the sense of supported by normative                   
reasons to desire. This assumption conflicts with a broadly Humean approach to such attitudes that rejects the idea                  
that desires can be evaluated --- “​'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the                     
scratching of my finger” they might say. I don’t have space to argue against Humeans here, so I will simply note that                      
my assumptions are not wholly uncontroversial. 
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are bad in general because they are ​ex ante unjustified (that is, insufficiently supported by               
reasons for those attitudes) or because they are merely ​ex post unjustified (that is, they are                
improperly based). Since ​all reasons-responsive attitudes can be improperly based, a general            
account of how a wide range of attitudes can be bad in the way that the Cosmos Club woman’s                   
belief is bad, which is premised on claims about basing, is not just possible but appealing. I will                  
criticize the first strategy and develop a version of the second. 
 
I’ll focus on the reasons-responsive attitudes of excitement and disappointment to make my case.              
For example, when your friend does well on the SAT, you are excited for them. When they do                  
poorly, you are disappointed for them. (You may also be disappointed ​in them, but that’s               
something different.) Whether you are excited or disappointed is generally a function of their              
actual SAT score and your expectations about their SAT performance. If someone scores 1000              
on their SAT, that may be a reason to be excited ​or disappointed for them, depending on these                  
background factors. 
 
According to statistics for 2017 provided by the National Centre for Education Statistics             
(NCES), students declaring a ‘Black’ ethnicity score an average of 941 and students declaring an               
‘Asian’ ethnicity score an average of 1181. Why this is so is a tragic, tangled mess, at least                  13
partly involving structural discrimination and many correlated factors such as affluence,           
structural racism, and the availability of tutors. It is far, far beyond the scope of this paper to sort                   
out this mess. It suffices for my purposes that the statistics provided by the NCES are,                
regrettably, facts, which I shall assume going forward. 
 
Now imagine two agents, Clara and Donna. Clara and Donna are friends with Alvin, someone of                
Asian ethnicity, and Brian, someone of African-American ethnicity. Clara and Donna know the             
same things. In particular, both know the NCES statistics and that Alvin is hoping to get at least                  
1100 on the SAT and that Brian is hoping to get at least 900. Suppose that Donna and Clara learn                    
13 https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=171 
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that both Alvin and Brian scored 1000 on the SAT and have the same reactions: excitement for                 
Brian and disappointment for Alvin. 
 
The case involves the following facts: 
1. The NCES statistics. 
2. Brian is hoping to get a 900 and Alvin an 1100. 
3. Brian and Alvin both score 1000. 
4. Clara and Donna know (1) and (2). 
5. Clara and Donna are each excited for Brian and disappointed for Alvin when learning (3). 
When Clara and Donna learn (3), this motivates them to be excited for Brian and disappointed                
for Alvin. Their motivating reason for being excited and disappointed, therefore, is (3) --- if this                14
claim is not intuitive, treat it as a stipulation.  
 
Given (1-5), it is ​possible for one of the agents, say, Clara, to be unobjectionably excited for                 
Brian and disappointed for Alvin. After all, there is good reason for excitement and              
disappointment, given Brian and Alvin’s hopes. As a result, Clara’s excitement and            
disappointment could be perfectly ​ex ante ​rational. So I’ll stipulate that it is. This is an important                 
difference from the Cosmos Club case where, according to Moral Encroachers, there is ​not              
sufficient reason for the woman’s belief, so it is not ​ex ante​ (that is, propositionally) justified. 
 
Despite the fact that there is sufficient reason for these reactions, it can be bad in the manner of                   
bad beliefs to feel excitement for Brian and disappointment for Alvin. For example, while Clara               
and Donna’s expectations can both be informed by the NCES statistics, those statistics can play a                
greater role in Donna’s excitement for Brian and disappointment for Alvin. In particular, the              
NCES statistics can play an inappropriate background role in Donna’s reactions, setting her             
14 I am assuming a broadly Davidsonian causal conception of motivating reasons for action and extending it to                  
motivating reasons for beliefs, actions, and sentiments. However, followers of Wittgenstein and Anscombe who              
doubt that the relation between motivating reasons and reaction is causal are free to interpret ‘motivates’ according                 
to their preferred theory. 
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expectations for what’s statistically normal for Alvin and Brian. In that case, they help explain               15
why she was moved to excitement and disappointment by news of Alvin and Brian’s scores:               
Brian scored above his ethnic group’s expected average! Alvin scored below his ethnic group’s              
expected average!  
 
Given the role that the NCES statistics play in Donna’s reactions, I submit that they are                
inappropriate. For example, there’s nothing wrong with Donna’s being excited for Brian because             
he scored a 1000 on the SAT all by itself. However, if the further explanation of why that score                   
moved Donna to excitement is that African Americans average a 941, then there’s something              
upsettingly ​patronizing about Donna’s reaction, in much the same way that the perhaps             
well-intended remark that Brian is “well-spoken” or “articulate” can be objectionably           
patronizing. We might hold something similar for Donna’s disappointment for Alvin. It’s fine to              
have high hopes for Alvin’s SAT scores. But having those high hopes because of the NCES                
statistics is bad --- bad in the way that bad beliefs are bad. 
 
Consequently, with these details made explicit, it’s clear that Clara’s reactions are not bad and               
that Donna’s are. However, because Clara’s reactions are not bad, that suggests that there is               
sufficient reason to have those reactions. Therefore, the explanation of why Donna’s reactions             
are bad ​cannot be that those reactions are not ​ex ante justified or lack sufficient reason. As a                  
result, we cannot apply the kind of explanation that exponents of moral encroachment advocate              
to the case of Clara and Donna, for it falsely implies that Clara’s reactions are inappropriate.                
Cases like these demonstrate that we need a different kind of explanation of how an attitude that                 
enjoys apparently sufficient support by reasons can be bad. 
 
4 Responding to the Right Reasons with the Right Attitude in the Right Way 
As I’ll now argue, there is independent motivation for accepting an alternative explanation of              
attitudes’ badness. I’ll begin by motivating this account (section 4) and defending it from various               
15 I’m implicitly appealing to Schroeder’s notion of a ‘background condition’ here --- see Schroeder (2007: Ch.2) ---                  
but while Schroeder focuses on background conditions for normative reasons, I’m extending the notion to               
motivating reasons. 
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objections (section 5). I’ll then (section 6) contrast moral encroachment and the alternative             
explanation’s  implications for practices of blaming for bad beliefs.  
 
Bad beliefs’ badness is puzzling because such beliefs are true, (apparently) well-evidenced, and             
bad all at the same time. Restricting ourselves to those three elements forces us to argue that                 
either the belief itself or its evidence or their combination is the source of the badness.                
Proponents of moral encroachment choose the second disjunct and argue that bad beliefs aren’t              
so well-evidenced after all -- bad beliefs’ high moral stakes make them very hard to justify.  
 
But bad attitudes have proved puzzling because of an overlooked fourth element: how one’s              
reaction is based on a reason, which is distinct from the reasons themselves, and from the                
reactions they favour such as belief, excitement, disappointment, etc. Overlooking this fourth            
element leads to the false assumption that attitudes based on sufficient reasons are             
unobjectionable. But this assumption is false. Attitudes can be bad in virtue of being badly based                
on sufficient reasons. Consequently, because reasons-responsive attitudes are attitudes that are           
based on reasons, ​any reasons-responsive attitude has the capacity to be bad in virtue of being                
badly based. 
 
I have already described one badly based attitude. When I know that Garfield is a cat and that all                   
cats are mammals, I am in a position to know that Garfield is a mammal. However, my belief                  
that Garfield is a mammal is badly based when it is formed on the basis of the invalid inference                   
rule ​from any combination of beliefs whatsoever, infer that Garfield is a mammal​. Although use               
of invalid inferences rules suffices to make a belief badly based, it is not necessary. For example,                 
when I see that it’s raining and you, a reliable testifier, tell me “It’s raining”, it would be odd,                   
other things equal, to base my belief that it’s raining on your testimony rather than my own two                  
eyes. Perhaps it wouldn’t be odd if I have bad eyesight or that I’m remarkably unreliable at                 16
discerning the weather, but things aren’t equal in that case. Although my belief is odd in some                 
16 Although his diagnosis of the case differs from mine, Muñoz (2018) argues that beliefs formed under these 
circumstances are at least partly defective. 
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sense, I have formed it in a valid way, based on testimony, which we may assume is sufficient                  
evidence for the belief in this case. 
 
Neither the Garfield belief nor the rain belief is ​morally bad, in the way that the Cosmos Club                  
woman’s belief is bad. They are simply malformed. But some ways of basing an attitude on a                 
reason are morally bad. For example, the ​moral worth of an action --- the special value that an                  
action has when it is non-accidentally right --- also depends not just on whether the action is                 
right or whether the action’s motivating reasons are good, but also on ​how the agent has based                 
their right action on those good motivating reasons. Consider a well-known case from the              17
Groundwork​. Kant describes a grocer who always does the right thing while running his              
business. For our purposes, imagine that he always does the more right thing when managing his                
store, returning the correct change in every transaction. This the grocer doesn’t return the correct               
change out of concern for what’s right or being honest. He is indifferent to morality as such and                  
cares only for himself. Rather, he is instead moved to give correct change by his belief that his                  
shop will be profitable only if he has a reputation for being honest. It is only due the lucky                   
coincidence of what’s prudent and what’s right that the grocer does what’s right. As a result, he                 
doesn’t act with moral worth. 
 
As several commentators have noted, although the grocer is indifferent to morality as such, he               
can nevertheless base his actions on morally good reasons. ​For example, the fact that a               18
customer had paid a dollar for a seventy-cent item is a morally good reason to return thirty cents;                  
it expresses a right-making feature of returning thirty cents in that circumstance. But our selfish               
shopkeeper, whose acts lack moral worth, can still act for that morally good reason when doing                
what’s right. Though the shopkeeper does what’s right for the right reason, his act isn’t properly                
based on moral reasons and, as a result, it lacks the distinctive goodness of moral worth.                
Attitudes can be made morally worse, therefore, in virtue of being badly based. 
 
17 C.f., Arpaly (2000; 2002), Markovits (2010), Lord (2018), and Isserow (2019), among many others. 
18 C.f., for example, Lord (2018: Ch.6). 
13 
The case raises a second question: why is the grocer’s intention or action improperly based? I                
won’t advance a theory of proper basing here. However, whether an attitude is properly based               19
on a set of reasons at least partly depends on the agent’s other mental states. For example, the                  
grocer’s uniquely self-interested desires clearly undermine the moral worth of his actions. Those             
desires explain why the grocer intends to return thirty cents when an agent has paid a dollar for a                   
seventy-cent item. But that explanation isn’t of the right type to endow the grocer’s behaviour               
with moral worth. 
 
The analogy with Kant’s grocer reveals that something similar is going on with Clara and Donna.                
Both have the correct reactions --- namely, disappointment for Alvin and excitement for Brian --               
in response to a good reason for those reactions --- namely, that Alvin and Brian both scored                 
1000. But Donna’s reactions are objectionable while Clara’s are not. I attributed this difference,              
in the previous subsection, to the inappropriate ‘background role’ that the NCES statistics play in               
Donna’s beliefs but not in Clara’s. We’re now in a position to flesh out this background role                 
somewhat. Just as the grocer’s selfish desires explain why he acts rightly for good moral reasons,                
Donna’s (but not Clara’s) belief in the NCES statistics explains why she is disappointed for               
Alvin and excited for Brian in response to learning their scores. In both cases, the background                
attitude explains why the individual bases their attitude on a certain set of reasons and having                
that attitude in a non-objectionable way requires a different explanation. It would require             20
Kant’s grocer to desire something other than his own gain and it would require Donna to attend                 
more to Alvin and Brian’s expectations for the SAT, and less on the NCES statistics, just as                 
Clara does. 
 
To complete my case, I’ll need to argue that the woman in the Cosmos Club has formed her true                   
belief badly. In doing so, I’ll assume that the Cosmos Club case is under-described for it                
assumes facts about the woman’s desires, broadly construed, to argue that she forms her belief               
19 That said, I am sympathetic towards the (distinct) accounts of Neta (2019) and Lord and Sylvan (2019). 
20 Something similar is true in the case of belief. When updating one’s credences in light of new evidence, one                    
conditionalizes against the background of other beliefs and evidence. 
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that Franklin is an attendant badly. I’ll discuss these assumptions’ consequences in the final              
section. 
 
When we judge that the woman in the Cosmos Club has a bad belief, I conjecture that we’re                  
filling in certain background details. In particular, I think that, on the reading of the case where                 
her belief is bad, we see her as a kind of ​wishful thinker --- a person whose background desires                   
have compromised her ability to evaluate evidence. The paradigm wishful thinker’s desires for             21
certain outcomes override her evidence that those outcomes obtain. She is the person who is               
sure, for no particular reason, that this lottery ticket is a winner --- she can just feel it.  
 
But other kinds of wishful thinking exist: she may convince herself that this ticket is a winner                 
because she’s played the lottery so many times and lost. This is the familiar gambler’s fallacy, a                 
subtler form of wishful thinking. The reason it’s subtler than the first form is that in the latter                  
case but not the former, the wishful thinker has a reason for thinking that her ticket is a winner --                    
namely, that she’s played ​so many times. It just happens to be a bad reason. But we can be                   
wishful thinkers with good reasons as well: imagine that, unbeknownst to the gambler, the tickets               
she buys each week are from a big finite pool, which shrinks after each drawing. In that case,                  
that she’s played ​so many times is ​in fact a good reason to increase her confidence that this                  
week’s ticket is a winner. However, despite having the right response to a good reason, the                
wishful thinker’s belief is no better than in the first case. After all, her wishful thinking, rooted in                  
her desire to win, causes her to have the wrong dispositions: even if she were to learn that the                   
rules of the lottery had changed and that the pool of tickets would be refilled after each drawing,                  
should would still draw the inference that this week’s ticket is a winner from the fact that she’s                  
played so many times. Just like the selfish grocer, the wishful thinker starts with a good reason                 
and ends with the right attitude but goes wrong along the way by basing her attitude on that                  
reason in the wrong way. 
 
21 I’m not the first to ground the badness of certain attitudes in motivated reasoning. See, for example, Appiah                   
(1990) and Arpaly and Schroeder (2013). My account offers an account of how motivated reasoning undermines an                 
attitude’s goodness, namely, by preventing the agent from properly basing her attitude on good normative reasons. 
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Features of the Cosmos Club case prompt assumptions, either rightly or not, about the woman’s               
character. The case is set in the not-too-distant past, in a city in the American south with                 
important ties to slavery, in an affluent, predominantly white club. The woman is the kind of                
woman who attends such clubs, and chooses to socialize with others who do, lives in that time                 
and place, etc. In short, what I’m saying is that to a certain reader sensitive to these social cues,                   
the woman sounds like a low-key racist, in a way that was widespread and normal in                
mid-century southern United States. When we read the case, we are not thinking of a woman                
ignorant of the tragic sociopolitical history that disproportionately forced African-Americans into           
employment as club attendants. We’re thinking of someone who is aware of that disproportionate              
allocation of labour, and considers it morally unremarkable. 
 
Low-key racists, in the sense that I intend, are wishful thinkers. For example, they are subject to                 
confirmation bias, which undermines the quality of their beliefs. Just as the wishful lottery              
player’s susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy undermines the quality of their belief that a              
particular ticket is a winner, even when that belief is (let’s imagine) true and even when the fact                  
on which they base their belief is sufficient evidence (“I’ve played ​so many times”), the Cosmos                
Club woman’s susceptibility to confirmation bias undermines the quality of her belief that             
Franklin is an attendant even when the belief is true and based on strong evidence. We should                 
attribute a similar flaw to Donna. Although her excitement and disappointment are the right              
attitudes to have, she has them in a bad way because she’s badly based those attitudes on                 
otherwise good reasons for them. Her undue attention to the NCES statistics taints the manner in                
which her good reasons support her correct attitudes.  
5 Moral Encroachment Encroachment and Other Objections 
I’ve just finished the case for my alternative, basing explanation of bad attitudes, of which the                
Cosmos Club belief is a special case. It draws on the thought that any reasons-responsive attitude                
can, in principle, be made morally worse by being badly based on good reasons. This alternative                
explanation is appealing because it generalizes across all reasons-responsive attitudes. In           
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contrast, the moral encroachment explanation does not generalize since it is predicated on claims              
about propositional justification, which apply only to doxastic attitudes like belief.  
 
However, in presenting the basing account, I’ve foregrounded a potential strategy for            
generalizing moral encroachment across all reasons-responsive attitudes. Moral encroachment         
problematically involves claims about propositional justification, which applies only to doxastic           
attitudes. As a result, moral encroachment’s explanation is too narrow to cover all             
reasons-responsive attitudes. However, as I claim above, propositional justification is a special            
case of ​ex ante justification, which applies to any reasons-responsive attitude when the attitude is               
adequately supported by reasons. As a result, it might seem that the moral encroachment              
explanation of bad beliefs could encroach on the badness of other attitudes as well. According to                
the view that I’ll call ​moral encroachment encroachment​, the high moral stakes associated with              
an attitude raise the bar for its ​ex ante justification. For example, according to this view, my                 22
excitement that the Raptors won the NBA championship may be justified when my excitement              
that Brian scored 1000 on the SAT is not, even if there is equally strong reason to be excited in                    
either case, when the moral stakes engendered by my excitement are sufficiently high --- perhaps               
because, say, my excitement tacitly reinforces norms and expectations about Black SAT            
performance. In that case, the moral encroachment explanation of bad beliefs encroaches on the              
explanation of other bad attitudes, like bad excitement. 
 
One difficulty with moral encroachment encroachment is not just that it falsely implies that              
Donna’s excitement is bad just if Clara’s excitement is, if they share all the same reasons ---                 
we’ve just seen that this is false --- but that it does ​not generalize adequately, despite                
appearances. Moral or pragmatic stakes appear ​not to encroach on other forms of ​ex ante               
justification, raising the sufficiency threshold of reasons for non-doxastic attitudes. For           23
22 In the following, I assume that stakes supervene on features wholly external to agents, like the facts. This                   
assumption is contestable; it may be that the stakes engendered by an agent’s beliefs are a function of partly internal                    
features, like the agent’s beliefs or their evidence. I assume the externalist account for simplicity. Thanks to Jessica                  
Brown for discussion here. 
23 Indeed, as the discussion in Fritz (forthcoming) suggests, encroachment-based reasons seem like reasons of the 
wrong kind to bear on the fittingness of attitudes like fear. 
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example, suppose that Brutish Biff the Bully (being both brawny and bellicose) can smell fear               
and he picks on those who are afraid. That Biff can smell fear raises the pragmatic stakes of                  
being afraid. But while it might make it imprudent to fear Biff, it doesn’t make Biff any less                  
fearsome --- that is, the fact that Biff can smell fear doesn’t make fear of Biff any less warranted                   
(though it might make fear worth avoiding if you can). Likewise, the fact that one more slice of                  
cake might exacerbate your diabetes doesn’t make it any less delicious; nor does the fact that by                 
buying the slice, you support Blake the bigoted baker, diminish its tastiness. Consequently, ​even              
if encroachment offers the correct explanation of cases like DeRose’s bank cases, its failure to               
generalize to non-doxastic attitudes should give us pause. The fact that the alternative             
explanation proposed above ​does generalize across all reasons-responsive attitudes is therefore a            
clear mark in its favour. 
 
A second challenge to the basing account holds that the account does not explain what needs to                 
be explained, namely, the ​moral badness of bad beliefs. Being badly based undermines an              
attitude’s ​ex post justification but being ​ex post unjustified is different from being morally              
objectionable. For example, my belief that Garfield is a mammal is ​ex post unjustified when               
inferred ​via a deviant inference rule. But it isn’t morally objectionable. So one might doubt               
whether the observations about the basing relation offered above address the distinctively moral             
mystery posed by bad beliefs and other bad attitudes. 
 
So far I’ve motivated the claim that badly based attitudes can be morally bad through an analogy                 
with Kant’s grocer. The grocer’s intention is morally worse than it could be given the grocer’s                
purely selfish desires. However, I don’t claim that being badly based is ​sufficient for an attitude                
to be morally objectionable. Rather, whether an attitude is morally objectionable depends on ​how              
it is badly based. Employment of deviant inference rules doesn’t, ​ceteris paribus​, taint             
downstream beliefs with immorality. However, other attitudes do: for example, it is ​bad​, ​ceteris              
paribus​, to pay attention to the NCES statistics when celebrating or commiserating with a              
friend’s SAT result. What matters in that situation is the friend’s expectations and hopes. It may                
be worth appealing to the NCES statistics to temper the friend’s self-directed disappointment or              
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deflate an inflating ego. But we’re talking about reactions like excitement and disappointment             
based on NCES statistics, not those statistics perhaps salutary use in framing an SAT result.               
Likewise, susceptibility to thinking Franklin is an attendant grounded in wishful thinking taints             
the woman’s downstream belief that Franklin is an attendant. The wishful thinking itself is              
morally objectionable, which infects the belief. 
 
Consequently, the basing account attributes a kind of ​derivative badness to bad attitudes, which              
is grounded in the agent’s character or, more narrowly, the dispositions that constitute their              
character. Whether particular consideration will move an agent to adopt a particular attitude is a               
function of those dispositions. But distinct dispositions can produce a particular attitude given a              
particular consideration. For example, an errant dog bark can startle two people, one because the               
bark was unexpected and the other because the bark recalled a traumatic dog attack in their                
youth. Likewise, though Alvin’s SAT score can cause both Donna and Clara to be              
disappointment, different dispositions account for that disappointment. Moreover, it’s clear that           
some dispositions are morally bad: cruelty, sloth, wrath, etc. Consequently, the basing account             
holds that an attitude is bad if an agent’s bad character explains why an otherwise good reason                 
moved the agent to adopt that attitude. The badness of bad attitudes is derivative of the more                 
familiar badness of bad character. 
 
This explanation contrasts favourably with moral encroachment’s explanation. According to the           
latter, beliefs are bad because they lack propositional justification. The badness licences what             
some call ‘epistemic blame’, the kind of blame characteristically licensed by the culpable             
mismanagement of one’s doxastic states. As Bouldt (forthcoming) argues, epistemic blame is            24
characteristically emotionally ‘cool’, in contrast to moral blame. For example, a doxastic agent             
can be liable to sanction when willfully and knowingly believing against the evidence. However,              
the nature of that sanction differs from when that agent willfully and knowingly violates the               
moral law. For example, in the latter case, but not the former, supposing that affront is                
sufficiently grave, ​anger is a fitting response. Similarly, in the former case, but not the latter,                
24 See Bouldt (forthcoming), Brown (2020; 2017), Rettler (2018), Nottelmann (2007), Peels (2016), Williamson 
(forthcoming), and Littlejohn (forthcoming). 
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diminishing epistemic trust in the truth of the agent’s beliefs and assertions is fitting. To be                25
sure, this distinction isn’t hard and fast, but “ It seems one can make [judgments about others’                 
culpable epistemic mistakes] without feeling any sort of emotion or concern for the matter.              
Meanwhile, it is perhaps more difficult to imagine making a moral judgment in a similarly cool                
fashion” (2).  26
 
The following is nothing more than a bare appeal to intuition, but it seems to me that the Cosmos                   
Club woman’s belief is blameworthy and ​not in a cool way. The woman hasn’t merely               
mismanaged her evidence; her possession of that belief constitutes a moral failing. As such, it is                
subject to emotionally ‘hot’, not ‘cool’ blame. As such, she is subject to more than merely                
epistemic blame. But moral encroachment licenses only epistemic blame. As a result, the             
approach is ill-suited to explaining the intuitions that the Cosmos Club case vividly, at least to                
me, elicits. So, rather than being ill-suited to explaining some beliefs’ badness, the basing              
approach is better poised to capture the relevant phenomena than its main rival since it connects                
the beliefs’ badness to a familiar target of moral evaluation, namely, moral character. 
6 Contrasting Accounts of Blame 
I’ll now focus on the final point of contrast between the proposed account and the moral                
encroachment account. Holding facts about evidence and putatively justification-affecting stakes          
constant, the moral encroachment account faults beliefs of a certain ​type --- that is, beliefs that                
share a certain content such as the proposition that Franklin is an attendant. In contrast, the                
proposed basing account faults particular belief ​tokens​, since the fault it attributes to these beliefs               
depends on how the belief-token is formed. As such, holding facts about evidence and stakes               
fixed, the basing account affirms and the encroachment account denies that it’s possible to              
believe that Franklin is an attendant without that belief being bad.  
 
It seems to me that this difference is an advantage of the basing account. For example, we can                  
imagine a doxastic agent who has been, through no fault of their own, isolated from American                
25 C.f., Kauppinen (2018). 
26 Bouldt (forthcoming). 
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history and the subtle but potent implications of being a Black man in a club like the Cosmos                  
Club in the mid-twentieth-century South. Perhaps the individual was raised in a remote and              
foreign rural location that lacked the resources to teach American history. Perhaps they’re a              
Martian. It doesn’t matter. It seems to me that, given the evidence, this agent could hold the                 
Cosmos Club belief without that belief being bad. However, if the moral stakes of this               
individual’s belief are the same as those of the woman in the Cosmos Club, then the moral                 
encroachment account falsely predicts that both beliefs are bad.  27
 
I don’t offer this observation as an objection to the moral encroachment account. Experience has               
taught me that intuitions about the badness of the foreign individual’s belief vary. Moreover,              
there is room for the proponent of moral encroachment to deny that the two beliefs involve the                 
same moral stakes. Rather, I’ll focus on an important metaphysical difference between how the              
two accounts ground blame for bad beliefs. In the abstract to ​Beliefs that Wrong​, Basu states the                 
motivation for her form of moral encroachment:  28
 
You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to               
the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now                 
reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of             
physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that             
although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence             
supports believing that the black diner in his section will tip poorly. He insists that the                
facts don’t lie. The facts aren’t racist. In denying his claim and in believing otherwise, it                
is you who engages in wishful thinking. It is you who believes against the evidence.               
You, not Spencer, are epistemically irrational. My dissertation gives an account of the             
moral-epistemic norms governing belief that will help us answer Spencer and the            
challenge he poses.  
 
27 Again, I’m assuming that stakes supervene on external facts. Were stakes to supervene on ​internal facts, such as                   
an individual’s beliefs about the riskiness of a belief, we might explain the acceptability of the foreigner’s belief by                   
his ignorance of the risks of his belief. Further argument is required, therefore, to rebut an internalist version of                   
moral encroachment. Thanks to Jessica Brown. 
28 https://philpapers.org/archive/BASBTW-2.pdf 
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Basu is attracted to moral encroachment partly because it affords a response to Spencer: not so,                
Spencer, ​you believe against the evidence because no evidence can propositionally justify a             
sufficiently morally fraught belief, like the belief that the Black diner in his section will tip                
poorly. More generally, moral encroachment permits one to accuse someone of some degree of              
badness themselves because they possess a bad belief and to criticize them on that basis. 
 
The account I’ve proposed does not license criticism of Spencer strictly on the content of his                
beliefs. That’s because it’s possible to believe what Spencer does in a neutral way when               
scrupulously attending only to the evidence and when the evidence sufficiently backs the belief.              
To use the bad belief as grounds for criticizing Spencer is then circular: if his belief is bad, it’s                   
because Spencer has based his belief on his evidence in a criticizable way. Claiming that the                
belief is bad, therefore Spencer is bad on the grounds that Spencer is bad, therefore his belief is                  
bad is absurdly circular. 
 
This may seem like a bad result for the view I’ve defended; it does not license blame based on                   
facts about belief alone. Spencer seems worthy of criticism -- or, at least, the case is consistent                 
with the possibility that Spencer merits criticism. But we can criticize him on the basis of facts                 
other than his beliefs. For example, if an agent is willing to reach for racially charged beliefs                 
when anodyne ones will do or if in response to an article on race relations in America, someone                  
like Spencer engages in a tangential diatribe about how race is predictive of tipping behaviour,               
then their willingness to reach for such beliefs and engage in ​non-sequitur diatribe is itself               
evidence of the kind of bad underlying dispositions that taint otherwise well-evidenced belief. So              
it does not follow from the account that I’ve proposed that we ​cannot blame or criticize Spencer.                 
It follows only that we cannot blame him ​strictly on the basis of his beliefs. Consequently, the                 
approach sketched here nevertheless captures much of what’s appealing about moral           
encroachment’s explanation of doxastic blameworthiness. 
22 
7 Conclusion 
I’ve argued that reasons-responsive attitudes can be bad when they are badly based in virtue of                
an agent’s bad character. Importantly, the argument I’ve defended here doesn’t establish that             
moral encroachment is false; it establishes only that bad beliefs’ badness can be explained              
without it. It may turn out that there are ​other cases of bad belief that only moral encroachment                  
explains. But even if that’s so, my arguments here expand our ability to explain bad attitudes                
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